¿Hasta qué punto está desinformada la persona interesada?  Una búsqueda de parámetros en la protección de datos personales de la UE by González Fuster, Gloria
IDP Issue 19 (October, 2014) I ISSN 1699-8154 Journal promoted by the Law and Political Science Department
www.uoc.edu/idp
Published: October, 2014
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya
Abstract
Information obligations have always been crucial in personal data protection law. Reinforcing these 
obligations is one of the priorities of the legislative package introduced in 2012 by the European 
Commission to redefine the personal data protection legal landscape of the European Union (EU). Those 
responsible for processing personal data (the data controllers) must imperatively convey certain pieces 
of information to those whose data is processed (the data subjects), and they are expected to do so in 
an increasingly transparent manner. Beyond these punctual information requirements, however, data 
subjects appear to always be and inevitably remain in a state of relative ignorance, as in almost constant 
need of further guidance. Data subjects are nowadays often depicted as unknowing consumers of online 
services, services which surreptitiously take away from them personal data thus conceived as a valuable 
asset. In light of these developments, this contribution critically investigates how EU law is envisaging 
data subjects in terms of knowledge. The paper reviews the birth and evolution of information obligations 
as an element of European personal data protection law, and asks whether thinking of data subjects as 
consumers is consistent with the notion of average consumer functioning in EU consumer law. Finally, it 
argues that the time might have come to openly clarify when data subjects are unlawfully misinformed, 
and that, in the meantime, individuals might benefit not only from accessing more transparent information, 
but also from being made more aware of the limitations of the information available to them. 
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¿Hasta qué punto está desinformada la persona interesada? 
Una búsqueda de parámetros en la protección  
de datos personales de la UE 
Resumen 
Las obligaciones de información siempre han sido un elemento esencial de las leyes de protección de 
datos personales. Reforzar estas obligaciones es una de las prioridades del paquete legislativo intro-
ducido en 2012 por la Comisión Europea para definir el panorama legal en materia de protección de 
datos personales de la Unión Europea (UE). Los responsables del tratamiento de datos personales (los 
controladores de datos) tienen que transmitir obligatoriamente determinada información a las personas 
de quienes se procesan estos datos (las personas interesadas) y se espera que lo hagan de forma cada 
vez más «transparente». Sin embargo, más allá de estos requisitos de información puntual, las personas 
interesadas siempre parece que se encuentran –e inevitablemente permanecen– en un estado de relativa 
ignorancia, casi en una necesidad constante de nuevas orientaciones. Actualmente, suelen describirse 
como consumidores desinformados que desconocen el funcionamiento de los servicios en línea, servicios 
que se apoderan subrepticiamente de datos personales considerados valiosos. Teniendo en cuenta todo 
esto, este artículo explora críticamente la manera como la legislación de la UE concibe a las personas 
interesadas en términos de conocimiento, analiza el origen y la evolución de las obligaciones de informa-
ción en la legislación europea sobre protección de datos personales y se pregunta si el hecho de concebir 
a las personas interesadas como consumidoras es consecuente con la noción de consumidor mediano 
que funciona en la legislación sobre consumo de la UE. En último lugar, sostiene que quizás ha llegado el 
momento de aclarar abiertamente cuándo las personas interesadas están ilícitamente mal informadas y 
señala que, mientras, podrían beneficiarse no tan solo de acceder a una información más «transparente» 
sino también de conocer mejor las limitaciones de la información que tienen a su disposición.
Palabras clave 
protección de datos, transparencia, Unión Europea, persona interesada, privacidad, información, con-
sumidor medio
Tema
protección de datos
1. Introduction
Individuals are not properly informed about the processing of 
personal data about them. This recurrent statement can hide 
behind its apparent simplicity many different assumptions. 
It can be used to justify the need for (better) laws on privacy 
and personal data protection, or, on the contrary, to prove 
their limitations or ineffectiveness. It can be presented 
as a problem to be tackled imposing obligations on those 
who process data (the data processors) or to inform those 
whose data are processed (the data subjects), but it can also 
be viewed as proof of a persistent resistance of such data 
processors to provide data subjects with the full picture of 
what is happening to the data about them.
This contribution1 investigates how data subjects are 
envisaged in relation to knowledge in European Union 
(EU) law. It looks for useful references to assess the 
extent to which individuals are supposed to be informed 
or uninformed about data processing practices concerning 
them, as well as to understand the conceptualisations 
 1.  The present research has been carried out in the context of the EU-funded project Privacy and Security Mirrors (PRISMS).
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 2.  L. A. Bygrave (2002, p. 107).
 3.  See, notably: M. Hildebrandt and B. J. Koops (2010,).
 4.  A. F. Westin (1970).
 5.  Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems (1973).
 6.  Loi n°78-17 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés du 6 janvier 1978, see Arts. 3 and 27.
 7.  Volkszählungsurteil, BVerfGE Bd. 65, S. 1 ff. Describing this right as a right to control the use of information about oneself: J. Q. Whitman 
(2004, p. 1161). 
 8.  Annex to the Recommendation of the Council of 23 September 1980: OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data, § 12.
 9.  OECD Guidelines, § 13 and § 27.
 10.  Ibid., § 7.
and operationalisations of such (mis)information. To this 
purpose, the paper first offers a brief historical review 
situating the roots of the recognition of an individual’s 
lack of knowledge at the very origins of personal data 
protection. This is followed by a review of information 
obligations of data processors and their relation to fairness 
and transparency. We then introduce the increasingly 
popular conception of data subjects as consumers, which 
leads to an inquiry into the possible applicability of the 
legal notion of average consumer in the context of EU data 
protection law.
2.  (Forever) Informing the Data 
Subject
The idea that individuals must be informed when data 
about them is processed came to light as early as the 
1960s. Historically, the surfacing of modern notions of 
privacy and personal data protection was precisely based 
on a perception of a dangerous loss of control and lack 
of awareness suffered by citizens due to the advent 
of computerisation. This feeling of disorientation and 
disempowerment2 was eventually described as resulting 
from a knowledge asymmetry between those managing vast 
quantities of data and those whose data are processed.3 
Privacy and personal data protection were thus promoted 
as legal tools enabling individuals to counter loss of control 
over what happens to data concerning them. 
2.1. Early recognition
When Alan F. Westin put forward his powerful vision 
of privacy as control over personal information,4 he 
was indeed reacting to the realisation that computers, 
and especially large databases, threatened to deprive 
individuals of any effective oversight of the fate of data 
about them when in the hands of others. In 1973, an 
influential report warned of the lessening of individuals’ 
control over data in the United States (US), and proposed 
a set of recommendations to mitigate this problem. One of 
them was the general prohibition of secret record keeping 
systems.5 
In France, since 1978 individuals have the right to be 
informed about any data used in automated processing 
practices affecting them. Since then, citizens are also 
entitled to receive information whenever somebody asks 
them for data, such as who the recipients are.6 In Germany, 
in 1983 the German Federal Constitutional Court recognised 
a fundamental right to informational self-determination, and 
did so by emphatically noting that such right is incompatible 
with a society where citizens do not know who knows what 
about them.7 
International data protection instruments have always 
imposed information obligations on those who process 
data. In 1980, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) set out in its Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data the openness principle. According to this principle, there 
must be ‘a general policy of openness about developments, 
practices and policies with respect to personal data’, 
whereby, whenever personal data are processed, individuals 
should be able to establish the existence and nature of such 
data, the main purposes of their use, who are the data 
controllers, and where to find them.8 In the OECD Guidelines, 
the openness principle functions as a prerequisite for the 
individual participation principle, which grants individuals 
a right to access information about data concerning them 
held by others.9 In addition, the collection limitation principle 
states that, as a general rule, collection of data must occur 
with the knowledge of the data subject.10 
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In 1981, the Council of Europe’s Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108)11 prescribed 
that everybody shall ‘be enabled to establish the existence’ 
of any automated data files containing data about them, as 
well as the main purposes of such files, and the residence, 
or place of business, of the file’s controller.12 Furthermore, 
individuals were entitled to obtain confirmation of whether 
data about them are stored by controllers, and a right to 
communication of the data.13
All in all, these developments describe the progressive 
incorporation into privacy and personal data protection 
laws of a certain right to know, as one of the components 
of a set of measures aimed at compensating a risk of loss of 
control over data suffered by individuals. Thus, this right to 
know emerges as a key to reduce ‘deficits in data subjects’ 
cognitive sovereignty’.14 This right does not correlate 
exactly with the duty to inform of data controllers,15 as it 
can also be addressed through other means.16 Importantly, 
however, the perceived lack of knowledge is not remedied 
by privacy and personal data protection laws, as various 
interlinked cognitive problems17 appear to persist and 
always seem to lead back to the reality of the uninformed 
individual.18
2.2. Existing obligations
The right to personal data protection nowadays has the 
status of a fundamental right of the EU. It is recognised 
as such by Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, a provision that, however, does not refer explicitly 
to any right to know, or even to any duty to inform.19 Despite 
this formal absence, a right to receive information can be 
regarded as implicitly acknowledged by the statement of the 
Charter’s Article 8 according to which personal data must 
be processed fairly, when read in conjunction with EU’s main 
instrument on personal data protection, Directive 95/46/
EC (the Data Protection Directive).20
The Data Protection Directive indeed sets out that 
personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully,21 and 
its preamble observes that, for the processing to be fair, 
‘the data subject must be in a position to learn of the 
existence of a processing operation’.22 The preamble goes 
on to clarify that data subjects must be given accurate and 
full information when data are collected, or when used in 
a way that could not have been anticipated at the time 
of collection.23 Hence, Directive 95/46/EC connects the 
data controller’s duty to inform to the requirement of fair 
processing.
The Directive’s provisions establishing obligations to inform, 
namely Articles 10 and 11, corroborate this link. They mark 
a distinction between compulsory information (such as the 
controller’s identity, and the purposes of the data processing) 
and some further information only required in certain cases. 
Such further information concerns the identification of the 
recipients of the data, and the existence of a right of access 
and a right to rectify, and must be given only when, having 
regard to the specific circumstances of the processing, it 
is required to guarantee fair processing.
 11.  Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 28.I.1981.
 12.  Art. 8(a) of Convention 108.
 13.  Ibid., Art. 8(b).
 14.  Bygrave, op. cit., p. 111.
 15.  In relation to the Spanish fundamental right to personal data protection, the Spanish Constitutional Court has alluded to the existence of 
both a right to know and a right to be informed of the use of data and its purpose (see § 6 of Sentencia 292/2000, de 30 de noviembre 
de 2000). 
 16.  For example, early national laws gave great importance to the notification of data processing practices to supervisory authorities, and to 
the availability of public registers, which aim generally to increase public awareness of those practices.
 17.  D. J. Solove (2013, p. 1888). 
 18.  Ibid., p. 1883.
 19.  M. C. Ruiz (2003, p. 39).
 20.  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, 31-50.
 21.  Art. 6(a) of Directive 95/46/EC.
 22.  Recital 38 of Directive 95/46/EC.
 23.  Recitals 38, 39 and 40 of Directive 95/46/EC.
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These provisions on information obligations have been 
commonly labelled transparency measures,24 even if 
Directive 95/46/EC does not use the term transparency in 
this context.25 Accepting the labelling, transparency can be 
described ‘a pre-condition to fair processing’,26 and the data 
controllers’ duty to inform27 may be depicted as a crucial 
measure to promote transparency.28 Insofar as it as an 
element of fair processing, in any case, the data controller’s 
duty to inform may also be accepted as an integral part of 
the EU fundamental right to personal data protection. 
A certain right to information can moreover be regarded as 
derived from the recognition in Article 8 of the EU Charter 
of a right to access and rectify data, both presented as 
constitutive elements of the EU fundamental right to 
personal data protection. To exercise such rights, data 
subjects need to be aware, first, of the fact that somebody 
is or might be processing data about them, and, second, of 
the fact that they enjoy the rights in question. Awareness 
of both issues is thus to some extent instrumental to the 
exercise of their rights.
Finally, Article 8 of the EU Charter also refers to the 
possibility to ground the legitimacy of data processing 
on the consent of the data subject. This brings in another 
link between the right to personal data protection and 
information requirements, as, to be valid, consent must 
be informed. The Data Protection Directive indeed defines 
consent as a freely given specific and informed indication 
of the data subject’s wishes signifying agreement to the 
processing of personal data.29
2.3. A need to inform more and better
Already more than a decade ago, the European 
Commission’s first report on the implementation of the 
Data Protection Directive30 concluded that the Directive’s 
provisions on the data controllers’ duty to inform were 
being put into effect across the EU in very divergent 
ways, and sometimes incorrectly. In 2004, European 
data protection authorities put under the spotlight the 
proliferation of inappropriate online notices, accused 
of often being very long and containing legal terms and 
industry jargon.31 They called for more readable formats,32 
and expressed support for multi-layered notices, which 
comprise a condensed notice from which more detailed 
information can be reached.33 
2.3.1. Towards a new transparency
In 2009, the European Commission formally inaugurated 
the review of Directive 95/46/EC. A 2009 study sponsored 
by the United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner’s 
Office (ICO) corroborated that there was a problem with 
the Directive’s information obligations, and argued that one 
of the main aspects of the problem was the way in which 
privacy policies were being written.34 The report stressed 
that, according to statistics, consumers felt strongly that 
mechanisms in place did not help them to understand their 
rights.35 
In 2010, the European Commission published a 
Communication delineating its approach to the future of EU 
 24.  ICO (2009). The Information Commissioner’s response to the European Commission’s consultation on the legal framework for the fundamental 
right to protection of personal data. On transparency as an element of fairness, see: A. Kuczerawy and F. Coudert (2011) and Bygrave, op. 
cit., pp. 58-59.
 25.  Actually Directive 95/46/EC never uses the term transparency, except once in the preamble, concerning the obligation of national supervisory 
authorities to publish annual reports (Recital 63).
 26.  Art. 29 Working Party (2009). The Future of Privacy: Joint contribution to the Consultation of the European Commission on the legal 
framework for the fundamental right to protection of personal data. WP 168, p. 8.
 27.  EU Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe (2014). Handbook on European Data Protection Law. Luxembourg: Publications 
Office of the EU, p. 99.
 28.  Analysis and impact study on the implementation of Directive EC 95/46 in Member States accompanying the European Commission’s First 
report on the implementation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), Brussels, 15.5.2003, COM (2003) 265 final, p. 19.
 29.  Art. 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC.
 30.  COM (2003) 265 final.
 31.  Art. 29 Working Party (2004). Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised Information Provisions. WP 100, p. 5.
 32.  WP 100, p. 5.
 33.  Ibid., p. 4 and 6.
 34.  N. Robinson et al. (2009, p. 26).
 35.  Ibid., p. 29. In another section the same study states that the interest and awareness of consumers have been demonstrated, citing another 
survey (p. 25). 
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personal data protection.36 Here, transparency was presented 
as ‘a fundamental condition for enabling individuals to 
exercise control over their own data and to ensure effective 
protection of personal data’.37 The Communication advanced 
as a basic element of such transparency that information 
to data subjects must be ‘easily accessible and easy to 
understand, and that clear and plain language is used’.38 
It observed that this was particularly relevant in the online 
environment, where privacy notices are often unclear and 
non-transparent, as allegedly proved by the results of a 
survey.39 To tackle this problem, the European Commission 
announced that it would consider introducing in EU law 
‘a general principle of transparent processing of personal 
data’.40
The 2010 Communication thus set in motion a subtle 
change in the meaning of transparency as a principle of 
EU data protection law. Whereas transparency had been 
traditionally understood as a principle implied in the 
principle of fair processing, encompassing a series of 
substantive requirements applicable to the data controller’s 
duty to inform, it started then to acquire an additional sense, 
primarily concerned with the form in which information is 
to be delivered to data subjects. A sort of new transparency 
was seeing the light. 
Still in the name of transparency, children were portrayed 
as deserving special consideration, because ‘they may be 
less aware of risks, consequences, safeguards and rights in 
relation to the processing of personal data’,41 thus requiring 
specific information practices. On top of that, the European 
Commission warned that it might contemplate drawing up 
EU standard forms, or harmonised privacy information 
notices.42
In parallel to these measures targeting transparency, the 
2010 Communication articulated a need to raise awareness, 
particularly among young people.43 The boundaries between 
transparency and awareness-raising were rather vague: 
for instance, the provision of clear information on web-
sites was depicted as pursuing both.44 As a matter of fact, 
the European Commission appeared concerned with the 
proliferation of opaque privacy notices in general, also 
raising the question of their impact on the very possibility 
for individuals to give informed consent to data processing 
practices.45 
2.3.2. Proposal on the table: The new transparency principle
The European Commission presented in 2012 its proposal 
for a General Data Protection Regulation, designed to 
replace Directive 95/46/EC.46 According to the Explanatory 
Memorandum accompanying the text, it introduces a new 
transparency principle,47 which is not defined. The principle 
primarily takes the shape of a general declaration that 
personal data must be ‘processed lawfully, fairly and in a 
transparent manner in relation to the data subject’48.
The proposal has a Chapter on the Rights of the Data Subject, 
with a Section titled ‘Transparency and modalities’. This 
 36.  European Commission (2010), Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European Union. Brussels, 4.11.2010, COM(2010) 
609 final. 
 37.  COM(2010) 609 final, p. 6.
 38.  Idem.
 39.  Idem.
 40.  Idem. During the elaboration of its proposal, the European Commission received input from many respondents alerting of the fact that 
transparency was already an integral part of EU data protection (see Annex 4 accompanying the Impact Assessment: Summary of Replies 
to the Public Consultation on the Commission’s Communication on a Comprehensive Approach to Personal Data Protection in the European 
Union, p. 56).
 41.  COM(2010) 609 final, p. 6.
 42.  Idem.
 43.  Ibid., p. 8.
 44.  Idem.
 45. Idem.
 46.  European Commission. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation). Brussels, 25.1.2012, 
COM(2012) 11 final.
 47.  Ibid., p. 8, where it is presented as a new element.
 48.  Art. 5(a) of the proposed Regulation (cf. Art. 6(1)(a) of Directive 95/46/EC, stating that personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully).
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Section opens with Article 11, on ‘Transparent information 
and communication’, foreseeing that controllers ‘shall have 
transparent and easily accessible policies49 with regard to 
the processing of personal data and for the exercise of data 
subjects’ rights’,50 and that any information to data subjects 
shall be provided ‘in an intelligible form, using clear and plain 
language, adapted to the data subject, in particular for any 
information addressed specifically to a child’.51 According to the 
proposed General Data Protection Regulation, therefore, the 
notion of transparent information should translate into easily 
accessible and (in spite of the tautology) transparent policies.
The substance of the data controller’s duty to inform is 
drawn up in the Section ‘Information and access to data’, 
which the proposal’s preamble connects to the principles 
of fair and transparent processing.52 This section specifies 
the information to be given to data subjects,53 extending 
minimum requirements to include informing about the period 
of storage of data, and making it compulsory to notify the 
existence of a right to access and to rectify,54 as well as of a 
right to lodge a complaint to a supervisory authority.55 This is 
to be complemented with ‘any further information necessary 
to guarantee fair processing in respect of the data subject’.56
The European Commission also advances that it may adopt 
implementing acts laying down standard forms for providing 
information to data subjects, ‘taking into account the specific 
characteristics and needs of various sectors and data 
processing situations where necessary’.57 The suggestion, 
however, has been publicly opposed by the Article 29 
Working Party, which considers it unnecessary,58 and also 
failed to find the support of the European Parliament.59
According to the impact assessment prepared by the 
European Commission before proposing its draft for the 
General Data Protection Regulation,60 data subjects are 
generally unaware of the risks linked to personal data 
processing, and they thus fail to take appropriate measures 
to protect their personal data.61 Of all data subjects, children 
are the most unaware of the risks at stake, which are however 
considerable, especially for them: ‘(i)n particular for young 
people’, the impact assessment states, ‘the disclosure of 
personal data can cause immense social and mental harm’.62 
It is not clear, however, how any increased awareness of 
children of the risks at stake might be capable of affecting 
their protection, as according to the proposed Regulation 
children are not to decide whether they consent or not to 
data processing practices. The decision is entrusted to the 
authorised parent or custodian.63
Globally speaking, the discussions on the draft of the General 
Data Protection Regulation hint towards a reinforcement of 
information obligations, regarding both the content of the 
information and formal requirements (in the spirit of the 
 49.  Privacy policies appears to be used here in the sense of privacy notice, or texts destined to the users of services (on the meanings of the 
term: B. Van Alsenoy (2012, p. 4).
 50.  Art. 11(1) of the Proposed Regulation.
 51.  Ibid., Art. 11(2). This provision is inspired by the 2009 Madrid Resolution on International Standards on the Protection of Personal Data and 
Privacy, where the openness principle was developed indicating that information must be provided to the data subject ‘in an intelligible 
form, using a clear and plain language, in particular for any processing addressed specifically to minors’, and by a provision proposed for a 
future Regulation on a Common European Sales Law, concerned with the duty to provide information when concluding distance contracts.
 52.  Recital (48) of the proposed Regulation.
 53.  For applicable exemptions, see Art. 14(5) of the Proposed Regulation.
 54.  Ibid., Art. 14(1)(d).
 55.  Ibid., Art. 14(1)(e).
 56.  Ibid., Art. 14(1)(h).
 57.  Ibid., Art. 14(8).
 58.  Art. 29 Working Party (2013). Working Document 01/2013: Input on the proposed implementing acts, WP 200, p. 6.
 59.  Amendment 110 of European Parliament’s Resolution of 12 March 2014, P7_TA-PROV(2014)2012.
 60.  European Commission, Staff Working Paper: Impact Assessment accompanying the document Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation), and Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution 
of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data, Brussels, 25.1.2012, SEC(2012) 72 final, p. 22.
 61.  SEC(2012) 72 final, p. 23.
 62.  Ibid., p. 29.
 63.  Art. 8 of the proposed Regulation.
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new transparency). They also suggest a strengthening of 
the conceptual link between being informed and exercising 
data subject’s rights. In parallel to all this emphasis on the 
need of individuals to be better informed, EU institutions are 
increasingly promoting the idea that data subjects, when 
disclosing personal data, shall be protected as consumers 
presumably trapped in a situation that very much escapes them. 
3.  A Portrait of the Data Subject  
as a Consumer 
There is no doubt that consumers, and most notably 
online consumers, might also be regarded as data subjects 
insofar as, when consuming, they engage in communicating 
or making available data about them. In addition to this, 
however, data subjects are increasingly portrayed as 
being consumers whenever data about them is collected 
in exchange for access to free online services. This image 
is used to stress that free online services might not be as 
free as they look, because the data that is collected through 
them about individuals has a certain economic value. 
The rationale behind the image of the data subject as a 
consumer is thus intrinsically tied to a depiction of users 
as typically uninformed and confused about the nature 
of the services they use, and hence misinterpreting their 
own behaviour. According to the impact assessment for 
the proposed General Data Protection Regulation, some 
individuals simply do not realise that many free online 
services rely on the processing of their personal data.64 
In this sense, some data subjects appear to be ill-informed 
to the point of misconceiving the very way in which online 
services function, leading them to engage in inattentive and 
incautious data practices.
Individuals would indeed not only be unaware of the fact that 
when using certain services they are celebrating in a way an 
economical transaction, but also ignorant of the price they 
are paying for it. An increasingly pervasive mantra depicts 
personal data as the new currency of the digital age,65 and, 
concomitantly, consenting to the collection of personal data 
is conceived of as an exchange, where access to services 
is traded with data that hence constitutes an asset. This 
mantra is sustained by research studying how individuals 
decide to disclose or not personal data from the perspective 
of behavioural economics.66
The depiction of data subjects as consumers is sometimes 
put forward to promote the need to reinforce the protection 
of users of online services, notably by resorting to safeguards 
and notions borrowed from consumer law.67 Taking this step, 
nevertheless, requires a prior careful examination of how 
consumers are actually envisaged in consumer law. 
3.1. The average consumer
EU law protects consumers through different instruments, 
and, in some areas, is guided by the ideal of the average 
consumer. This notion originally emerged in the case law 
of the EU Court of Justice68 in connection with the free 
movement of goods, labelling and misleading advertising; 
further delineated in cases about trademark infringement, 
it eventually integrated EU secondary law.69 Currently, the 
notion is notably employed in EU law to define misleading 
commercial practices, which shall be regarded as misleading 
if they would mislead an average consumer.70 
3.1.1. Reasonably well informed, observant and circumspect
The average consumer is a theoretical figure described as 
reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and 
circumspect, even if this depiction can vary taking into 
account social, cultural and linguistic factors.71 The average 
consumer is regarded as a critical consumer, as opposed 
to a naïf consumer who would believe, for instance, any 
promotional marketing tricks.72 
 64.  SEC(2012) 72 final, p. 22.
 65.  Noting this trend in EU policy: E. Wauters et al. (2013).
 66.  See, for instance: A. Acquisti (2004); L. Brandimarte et al. (2013).
 67.  See: European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) (2014).
 68.  See: Case C-210/96, Gut Springenheide and Tusky (1998) ECR I-4657, para 31. 
 69.  R. Incardona and C. Poncibò (2007, p. 22).
 70.  B. Van der Meulen and M. Van der Velde (2011, p. 421). 
 71.  European Commission (2009). Commission Staff Working Document: Guidance on the Implementation/Application of Directive 2005/29/
EC on Unfair Commercial Practices, Brussels, SEC(2009) 1666, pp. 25-28.
 72.  Case C-470/93, Verien gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Koln e. V. v Mars GmbH (1995) ECR I-01923, para 24.
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Reliance on the figure of the average consumer is supposed 
to help in striking a fair balance between the need to protect 
consumers and promoting free trade. By discarding the idea 
that consumers are, as a general rule, weak, credulous or 
in need of help, it is possible to refute the validity of a 
number of protective measures that could be perceived as 
unjustified trade barriers.73 From this viewpoint, the birth of 
the average consumer has been described as a move away 
from a paternalistic view of consumer law.74 
The average consumer test is never a statistical test. 
Courts and responsible authorities must always exercise 
their own faculty of judgement, having regard to the case 
law of the EU Court of Justice, to determine the typical 
reaction of the average consumer in a given case.75 In 
principle, they should not need to commission any expert’s 
report or consumer research poll.76 It will ultimately 
always be up to courts and responsible authorities to 
determine the percentage of consumers misled by a 
measure sufficiently significant to justify prohibiting such 
measure,77 remembering that survey results are subject 
to the frailties inherent in the formulation of survey 
questionnaires.78 The notion of the average consumer as 
a reasonably well informed individual has been widely used 
in the area of food law regardless of the fact that many 
studies have demonstrated that an important number of 
consumers are unable to actually understand much of the 
information on food labels.79
3.1.2.  Actively looking for information to make the right 
choices
The prototypical average consumer has an attitude 
that contributes to the constant improvement of 
knowledge:80 always ready to obtain more information to 
make efficient choices, always in a position to acquire 
available information, and to act wisely on it.81 On the 
basis of this conception of the average consumer, the EU 
Court of Justice considers that it is generally preferable to 
provide information to consumers so they can make their 
own choices, instead of trying to think on their behalf.82 
Information appears, thus, in the context of EU consumer 
law as a tool placed in the hands of consumers to enable 
them to decide freely.83 
3.1.3.  Not an obstacle to protect vulnerable consumers
Taking generally as a benchmark the average consumer 
is not incompatible with the protection of especially 
vulnerable consumers. Vulnerable consumers are 
recognised as existing, even if they are not regarded as 
the norm. Where a practice specifically targets a particular 
group of consumers, it is desirable that the impact of the 
practice be assessed from the perspective of the average 
member of that specific group.84 According to EU consumer 
law, individuals can be particularly vulnerable because of a 
mental or physical infirmity, because of their age (notably, 
the elderly, children and teenagers), or because of their 
credulity.85
The vulnerable consumer test applies when it is foreseeable 
that a practice will affect the economic behaviour of a group 
of consumers. Hence, companies are only responsible for the 
negative impact of their practices on vulnerable consumers 
if they could reasonably expect such impact, and if they fail 
to take steps to mitigate it.86
 73.  SEC(2009) 1666, p. 25.
 74.  Incardona and Poncibò, op. cit., p. 22.
 75.  SEC(2009) 1666, p. 25.
 76.  Ibid., p. 28.
 77.  Case C-220/98, Estée Lauder Cosmetics GmbH & Co. OHG v Lancaster Group GmbH (2000) ECR I-00117, para 31.
 78.  Opinion of Advocate General Fenelly for Case C-220/98, para 29. 
 79.  C. MacMaoláin (2007, p. 78).
 80.  Identifying attitude and knowledge as basic elements of the average consumer: L. González Vaqué (2005).
 81.  SEC(2009) 1666, p. 25.
 82.  Van der Meulen and Van der Velde, op. cit., p. 422.
 83.  See, for instance, Art. 3(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision 
of food information to consumers, OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, 18-63.
 84.  SEC(2009) 1666, p. 28.
 85.  Ibid., p. 29.
 86.  Ibid., p. 31.
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3.2.  Reconstructing the standard 
data subject
The described sketch of the average consumer makes visible 
some important frictions between this notion and the way 
in which the concept of data subject operates in EU law. 
First and foremost, it seems extremely difficult to maintain 
that the data subject is regarded in EU law, by default, as 
being well informed. On the contrary, as noted above, one 
of the elementary assumptions behind the emergence 
of personal data protection law is that individuals lack 
sufficient knowledge of data processing practices affecting 
them, or are on the verge of losing control over data. Data 
subjects appear to be originally and generally deprived of 
a satisfactory level of information. Once some pieces of 
information have been transmitted to them, the processing 
of their personal data might be regarded as fair, and they shall 
be able to make punctual informed decisions on whether 
to consent to some practices, but generally speaking they 
remain predominantly uninformed. 
Information provided to individuals shall allow them to 
decide whether to consent or not,87 but is not envisaged 
as generally contributing to making choices between data 
processing options. In Deutsche Telekom,88 the EU Court 
of Justice had to clarify whether, when an undertaking 
responsible for assigning telephone numbers wishes 
to pass on personal data on subscribers to a company 
providing publicly available directories, it is necessary for 
the undertaking to rely on the subscriber’s consent, or on 
the subscriber’s lack of objection.89 The Court of Justice, 
analysing Directive 2002/58/EC,90 stated that its provisions 
do not establish a selective right of subscribers to decide 
in favour of certain providers of public directories. And the 
Court went on to add that when subscribers consent to their 
data being published in a directory with a specific purpose, 
assuming the detrimental impact of such decision,91 they 
will ‘generally not have standing to object to the publication 
of the same data in another, similar directory’.92 
Individuals’ level of knowledge is very closely linked to 
their attitude towards information. Data subjects do not 
appear to be especially zealous to acquire more information, 
particularly when they are online, and might thus probably 
not be described as observant and circumspect. The 
appreciation of the eagerness of the data subject towards 
seeking information can affect the way in which information 
obligations are designed. In this context, multi-layered 
notices open the question of the extent to which information 
that is not given in a first layer, but only indirectly received 
or made available, has been received or made available at all. 
In 2012, the EU Court of Justice ruled that, in the context of 
distance contracts, consumer protection obligations compel 
to assess that where information that should be provided on 
a seller’s website is made accessible only via a link sent to 
consumers, that information is neither given to consumers, 
nor received by them, for the purposes of EU law.93 
3.3.  A confused consumer  
and disoriented policy-making? 
Against this background, it appears that configuring the 
data subject as a consumer has some important conceptual 
drawbacks. In the name of the alleged persistent 
misconceptions affecting the behaviour of online users, 
who seemingly indulge in using free online services that in 
reality might not be free, data subjects are pushed towards 
a field of law where individuals are actually portrayed as 
by default well informed, observant and circumspect, and 
thus offered somehow limited protection. This leads to a 
paradoxical situation in which, because they are regarded 
as ignorant of how the Internet functions, individuals might 
qualify to be treated by law as reasonably well informed 
subjects. 
 87.  Expressing awareness of some data processing practices does not equal consenting to them. See, notably: Joined Cases C-92/09 and 
C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, 9 November 2010, paras 61-64 and 88, as well as the Opinion 
of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 17 June 2010, Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, para 77.
 88.  Case C-543/09 Deutsche Telekom, 5 May 2011.
 89.  Para 48.
 90.  Specifically, Art. 12(2) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing 
of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, OJ L 201, 31.07.2002, 37-47.
 91.  Para 62.
 92.  Idem.
 93. Case C-49/11, Content Services Ltd v Bundesarbeitskammer, 5 July 2012, para 37.
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Similarly, the role entrusted to information in EU personal 
data protection law and in EU consumer law is appreciably 
different: whereas for the latter it can facilitate making 
choices between products and services, for the former it 
has instead other purposes (namely, contributing to fair 
and transparent processing, and allowing for consent). 
It is somehow delicate, thus, to attempt to expand on 
the conception of the data subject as consumer in order 
to configure information obligations imposed on data 
controllers as helping to make choices between different 
data processing practices.94 
There are also, however, dimensions of personal data 
protection law that could benefit from taking into account 
the way in which EU law conceptualises consumers. One 
of them is the construal of vulnerability: it is not limited 
to children, but can be recognised as also affecting other 
groups, and is in any case something different than a mere 
(temporary) unawareness of risks, which is what the European 
Commission habitually identifies as affecting children.
More importantly, defining a standard notion of data subject 
in terms of information and capability to make choices 
appears as a necessary prerequisite to define which online 
practices are unlawfully misleading. It is striking that 
despite the significance of the data subject’s right to know 
and of information obligations imposed on data controllers 
for European personal data protection, there is no clear 
benchmark in EU law as to the level of misinformation of data 
subjects to be regarded as unlawful. The current stress on 
the need for information provided by data controllers to be 
transparent is based on the concession that the instruments 
typically presented as supposedly complying with the data 
controllers’ duty to inform (the privacy policies or privacy 
notices proliferating online) are commonly uninformative. 
In defiance of this contention, however, the legislator does 
not appear to be ready to directly qualify uninformative and 
deceptive so-called privacy tools as unlawful, or to provide 
clearer specifications as to what is always to be regarded 
as untransparent and unfair.
4. Concluding Remarks
This contribution has examined the relationship between 
information and the protection of individuals from the 
perspective of EU personal data protection. It has identified 
the existence of a kind of structural ignorance that is 
ascribed to the data subject, partially mitigated through the 
imposition of information obligations on data controllers. 
The recently reinvented notion of transparency as a set 
of formal demands applicable to information obligations 
confirms their importance in the building up of EU personal 
data protection. Together with this approach, the idea that 
data subjects shall be protected as unaware consumers of 
not free online services is gaining momentum.
Data subjects are more than consumers. They are the 
individuals to whom is granted the EU fundamental right 
to the protection of personal data, and it is the responsibility 
of the EU to respect and promote its fundamental rights. 
As described, the right to personal data protection brings 
about the need to inform individuals about what happens 
to their personal data, but also about the existence of 
their subjective rights, and, possibly, about the risks or 
consequences of consenting or refusing to consent to 
certain data processing practices.
In reality, the active exercise of this right by individuals 
might actually require not only the existence of a certain 
right to know, but also an awareness of the limitations of the 
information they are legally entitled to receive, as an open 
invitation to act very observantly and with circumspection 
even in the absence of satisfactory levels of information  –or 
precisely because of such absence. Perhaps data subjects 
able to make better decisions online are not data subjects 
surrounded by more transparent privacy notices, but data 
subjects more acutely aware of the fragility of the knowledge 
at their disposal. 
 94.  Which is the path followed by the EDPS in European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) (2014), op. cit. (see notably p. 34).
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